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Abstract  
We develop a model of international trade between two symmetric countries that features inter-
group inequality between entrepreneurs and workers, and also intra-group inequality within 
each of those two groups. Individuals in the economy are heterogeneous with respect to their 
entrepreneurial ability, and firms run by more able entrepreneurs have a higher productivity 
level and make higher profits. There is rent-sharing at the firm level due to fair wage 
preferences of workers, and hence firms with higher profits pay higher wages in equilibrium in 
order to elicit their workers' full effort. We show that in this framework international trade 
increases income inequality between entrepreneurs and workers, and also inequality within 
these two subgroups of individuals, as measured by the respective Gini coefficients. Involuntary 
unemployment increases, but so does aggregate welfare. 
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4.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary 
The recent literature on international trade with firm heterogeneity has substantially improved our 
understanding of the effects that market integration has on national economies. In this paper, we suggest 
that it is also a natural starting point for the re-assessment of a classic question in international 
economics: the impact of economic integration on the distribution of income within countries. 
 
Firm heterogeneity in our framework results from heterogeneous abilities of entrepreneurs. One 
entrepreneur, who acts as owner-manager, is needed to run each firm. Firms run by more able 
entrepreneurs are more productive, leading to higher operating profits, which in turn are reflected in higher 
incomes for the respective entrepreneurs. We enrich this basic model structure and account for labour 
market imperfection, which we introduce by means of a fair wage-effort mechanism in the spirit of Akerlof 
and Yellen (1990). Workers' fair wage preferences lead to rent-sharing at the firm level: More able 
entrepreneurs, running firms with higher operating profits, have to pay their production workers higher 
wages in order to elicit full effort. Hence, our model features inequality along three dimensions. First, there 
is income inequality between different groups of individuals -- entrepreneurs and production workers – 
that is determined by the ratio between the respective average incomes. Second, there is income 
inequality among entrepreneurs of differing abilities. And third, there is intra-group wage inequality among 
ex ante identical workers due to the fair wage-effort mechanism. As is typically the case in efficiency wage 
models, there is involuntary unemployment at the aggregate level as wages do not adjust to clear the 
labour market.  
 
We endogenise the number of firms by letting individuals decide between three different tasks: setting up 
a firm, choosing self-employment in a perfectly competitive service sector or applying for a job as a 
production worker. This decision depends on the entrepreneurial ability level, because entrepreneurial 
ability determines productivity and thus income of a firm owner, while it is irrelevant for performing either 
of the other two tasks.  
 
Our main results are as follows. In the closed economy equilibrium, we find that the more important the 
rent sharing motive is in workers' fair wage preferences, the smaller becomes the difference between the 
average income of entrepreneurs and the average income of production workers, and the smaller 
becomes the income inequality within the group of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the income 
inequality within the group of unskilled workers increases. Average productivity decreases, with adverse 
consequences for total output and aggregate employment. We are particularly interested in the effects of 
trade liberalisation. As is standard in heterogeneous firm models of international trade, we assume that 
there are fixed costs involved in exporting, and as a consequence not all firms find exporting worthwhile. 
In this case, trade liberalisation leads to a self selection of the high productivity firms into export status, an 
increase in aggregate unemployment and increasing inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as 
well as within the groups of entrepreneurs and workers, respectively. Aggregate output -- and therefore 
welfare -- increases, provided that the selection effect is sufficiently strong. 
 1 Introduction
The recent literature on international trade with ﬁrm heterogeneity has substantially im-
proved our understanding of the eﬀects that market integration has on national economies.1
In this paper, we suggest that it is also a natural starting point for the re-assessment of
a classic question in international economics: the impact of economic integration on the
distribution of income within countries.
The key contribution of this paper is to provide an integrated framework featuring
diﬀerent types of inequality that appear to be relevant empirically, and yet is simple enough
to allow the comprehensive analysis of the eﬀects of international trade. In addition to
inequality between workers of diﬀerent skill levels, which has been the traditional concern
of trade economists at least since the days of Stolper and Samuelson, we also look at
inequality among workers of the same skill group. There is little doubt that in many
countries intra-group wage inequality is an important part of overall inequality, and that
it has increased substantially over the past decades (Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and
Lucifora, 2006; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2007). The observed increase in intra-group
wage inequality has been parallel to the widely documented surge in intermediate goods
trade, and we would therefore argue that it is important to treat it as an integral part of
the overall relationship between economic integration and income distribution.
When it comes to modelling intra-group wage inequality, two principal possibilities
have been explored in the trade literature. The ﬁrst is to consider a model where identical
individuals perform diﬀerent tasks in equilibrium. A setup of this type naturally generates
intra-group wage inequality if wages are task speciﬁc (Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko,
2007). A second modelling strategy, and the one we are pursuing in the present paper,
focuses on heterogeneity of ﬁrm characteristics and introduces a mechanism by which this
1The most widely used theoretical framework is due to Melitz (2003). This model accounts for the
stylized empirical fact that only the best ﬁrms export (see Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and
Jensen, 1999). Important contributions that build on the Melitz framework include work by Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007). Alternative frameworks which account
for ﬁrm heterogeneity in the context of trade are provided by Manasse and Turrini (2001), Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
1heterogeneity translates into ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages. In previous contributions to this strand
of the literature, inter-ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials have been determined by exogenous diﬀer-
ences between ﬁrms in their monitoring technology (Davis and Harrigan, 2007) and their
productivity (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2007), respectively. In the present paper, we model
wages at the ﬁrm level as depending positively on operating proﬁts (which are, of course,
themselves endogenous).2 There is strong empirical support for the idea that larger, more
productive ﬁrms, which are also the ﬁrms that export, pay higher wages (Bernard and
Jensen, 1995, 1999). A positive relationship between ﬁrm size and wage payments is also
well documented in the empirical labour literature (Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey,
1996; Bayard and Troske, 1999). This relationship even survives if one rigorously controls
for individual and job characteristics. Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen (2007) utilize
UK panel data to show that ﬁrm productivity is indeed a key determinant of individual
wage inequality.3 Our present model is compatible with these stylised facts as larger, more
productive ﬁrms have higher operating proﬁts as well.
Firm heterogeneity in our framework results from heterogeneous abilities of entrepre-
neurs. One entrepreneur, who acts as owner-manager, is needed to run each ﬁrm. Firms
run by more able entrepreneurs are more productive, leading to higher operating prof-
its, which in turn are reﬂected in higher incomes for the respective entrepreneurs. We
enrich this basic model structure and account for labour market imperfection, which we
introduce by means of a fair wage-eﬀort mechanism in the spirit of Akerlof and Yellen
(1990).4 Workers’ fair wage preferences lead to rent-sharing at the ﬁrm level: More able
2Outside the ﬁeld of international trade, a complementary approach to modelling intra-group wage
inequality has focused on unobservable heterogeneity of individual characteristics like learning abilities
(Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 2002).
3In an international trade context, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) are particularly notable in
identifying ﬁrm characteristics as an important explanatory variable for individual wage inequality. Using
a large set of linked employer–employee data from Germany, they identify a wage premium of exporters
even if one controls for observable and unobservable characteristics of both individuals and the workplace.
4There is considerable empirical support for a mechanism of this type, as illustrated in the review articles
by Howitt (2002) and Bewley (2005). Both stress the wide extent and strength of evidence supporting the
fair wage model from a range of sources including: surveys of managers and workers, ﬁrm-level studies of
2entrepreneurs, running ﬁrms with higher operating proﬁts, have to pay their production
workers higher wages in order to elicit full eﬀort. As is typically the case in eﬃciency wage
models, this leads to involuntary unemployment at the aggregate level as wages do not
adjust to clear the labour market.
Taking stock, our model features inequality along three dimensions. First, there is
income inequality between diﬀerent groups of individuals – entrepreneurs and production
workers – that is determined by the ratio between the respective average incomes. Second,
there is income inequality among entrepreneurs of diﬀering abilities. And third, there is
intra-group wage inequality among ex ante identical workers due to the fair wage-eﬀort
mechanism.
We endogenise the number of ﬁrms by letting individuals decide between three diﬀerent
tasks: setting up a ﬁrm, choosing self-employment in a perfectly competitive service sector
or applying for a job as a production worker. This decision depends on the entrepreneurial
ability level, because entrepreneurial ability determines productivity and thus income of
a ﬁrm owner, while it is irrelevant for performing either of the other two tasks. Clearly,
it must be the case in equilibrium that at the point of decision making the marginal
entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between setting up a ﬁrm and not doing so.
Our main results are as follows. In the closed economy equilibrium, we ﬁnd that the
more important the rent sharing motive is in workers’ fair wage preferences, the smaller
becomes the diﬀerence between the average income of entrepreneurs and the average in-
come of production workers, and the smaller becomes the income inequality within the
group of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the income inequality within the group of
unskilled workers increases. Average productivity decreases, with adverse consequences
for total output and aggregate employment. We are particularly interested in the eﬀects
of trade liberalisation. As is standard in heterogeneous ﬁrm models of international trade,
we assume that there are ﬁxed costs involved in exporting, and as a consequence not all
ﬁrms ﬁnd exporting worthwhile. In this case, trade liberalisation leads to a self selection
of the high productivity ﬁrms into export status, an increase in aggregate unemployment
pay and termination patterns, and experiments.
3and increasing inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as well as within the groups
of entrepreneurs and workers, respectively. Aggregate output – and therefore welfare –
increases, provided that the selection eﬀect is suﬃciently strong.
There are a number of contributions to the heterogeneous ﬁrm literature that look
at certain aspects of the trade-inequality nexus that is analysed in our paper. The only
contribution we know of that considers, as we do, both between- and within-group wage
inequality in an integrated framework is Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2007). In
their search and matching model with skilled and unskilled workers, and high- and low-
tech ﬁrms, unskilled workers are matched with low-tech ﬁrms, while skilled workers can
be matched with either high- or low-tech ﬁrms. Wages of skilled workers depend on the
type of ﬁrm they are matched with, and globalisation aﬀects both the relative wage of
skilled workers employed in diﬀerent types of ﬁrms and the relative wage between skilled
and unskilled workers.
There are three papers that address the eﬀects of globalisation on the skill premium in
a heterogeneous ﬁrm framework, while being silent on intra-group wage inequality. The
paper closest to ours is Manasse and Turrini (2001). In their model, as in ours, each
ﬁrm is run by an entrepreneur (“skilled worker”) who has to hire homogenous unskilled
(“raw”) labour for the actual production process. The market for unskilled labour is
assumed perfectly competitive, and therefore unskilled workers are paid the same wage
in all ﬁrms.5 In Yeaple (2005), heterogeneous labour is the only factor of production,
and globalisation aﬀects the inequality between workers of diﬀering skill levels. Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2007) extend the heterogeneous ﬁrm model of Melitz (2003) to a
two-sector, two-factor framework, and globalisation in their model has an eﬀect on the
relative return of the two factors of production.
5In addition, the number of skilled workers (and hence the number of ﬁrms), while endogenous in our
model, is exogenous in Manasse and Turrini. As a direct consequence of this diﬀerence, globalisation has
opposite eﬀects on inter-group income inequality in both models: While the skill premium increases in
our model, it falls in Manasse and Turrini (2001). See Meckl and Weigert (2007) for a contribution that
endogenises the number of ﬁrms in a model of the Manasse-Turrini type with a distortion-free labour
market. Their paper does not look at inequality but focuses on the question of skill formation.
4Complementary to these papers, the models of Davis and Harrigan (2007) and Egger
and Kreickemeier (2007) feature wage diﬀerences between identical workers in a Melitz-
type framework, but – with only one homogenous factor of production – are silent by
construction on inter-group inequality between diﬀerent groups of individuals (skilled and
unskilled workers, or as in our case, workers and entrepreneurs). While both models are
equipped in principle to discuss intra-group wage inequality, the analysis in these papers
does not focus on sophisticated measures of inequality but on other aspects of globali-
sation, like employment eﬀects and the possible destruction of good jobs that oﬀer high
income opportunities for workers. Furthermore, while these papers emphasise one impor-
tant channel through which trade liberalisation can inﬂuence intra-group wage inequality,
namely ﬁrm selection, i.e. changes in the composition of producers, they do not account
for another important channel, which is more closely related to the idea of rent sharing.
With inter-ﬁrm wage inequality being triggered by diﬀerences in exogenous parameters
(monitoring technology or productivities, see above), these papers cannot discuss how
trade liberalisation aﬀects the wage proﬁle, i.e. the wage paid by some active ﬁrm relative
to the wage oﬀered by a baseline producer, because this ratio is exogenous by construc-
tion. In our framework, wages are linked to ﬁrm proﬁts, due to a rent-sharing motive of
workers. Hence, trade liberalisation inﬂuences the wage proﬁle, as it aﬀects ﬁrm proﬁts
asymmetrically.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the closed
economy version of our model. Section 3 analyses the eﬀects of international trade on the
key variables of interest: welfare, unemployment and intra- as well as inter-group wage
inequality. Section 4 concludes.
2 Fair Wages and Firm Heterogeneity in a Closed Economy
Consider an economy with population of mass N. Two types of goods are produced:
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and homogeneous ﬁnal output.
52.1 The Final Goods Sector








, 0 < ρ < 1, (1)
with the measure of set V representing the mass of available intermediate goods M. In the
(hypothetical) case where the ﬁnal goods sector used an equal quantity q of all intermediate
inputs, the production technology in (1) would yield Y = Mq, and hence increasing M
for a given aggregate level of input would not increase aggregate output.6
We take ﬁnal output as the num´ eraire and assume perfect competition in the ﬁnal










with σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) being the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent varieties of
intermediate goods. Due to the choice of num´ eraire, we have P = 1. Using this normal-
isation, proﬁt maximisation of competitive ﬁnal goods producers leads to the following





2.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
At the intermediate goods level, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms, each producing a unique variety. Hence, the mass of intermediate goods producers
equals M, the mass of varieties utilised by the ﬁnal goods sector. When entering the
market, each ﬁrm must set up its own distribution system, bearing a ﬁxed cost sf, where
f is the quantity of distribution services used, and s is the fee paid per unit. Once ﬁxed
6Using technology (1) instead of the traditional Ethier (1982) technology, which features external scale
economies, is attractive for two reasons. On the one hand, we avoid a negative relationship between country
size and the unemployment rate, which would be counterfactual. And, on the other hand, we exclude trade
eﬀects that are merely driven by an increase in market size and are well understood for a long time. See
Egger and Kreickemeier (2007) and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2007) for further discussion.
6cost sf is incurred, output at the ﬁrm level q is linear in labour input l and depends on





with w(φ) denoting the wage paid to a physical unit of labour (a worker) in a ﬁrm with
productivity φ and ε being the eﬀort level provided by workers. Hence, w(φ)/(φε) is the
marginal cost of a ﬁrm with productivity level φ, and the price is a constant markup 1/ρ










Furthermore, operating and total proﬁts are given by πv(φ) = r(φ)/σ and π(φ) = r(φ)/σ−
sf, respectively.
Each ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector is run by an entrepreneur, who acts as
owner-manager of the ﬁrm. For the decision to become an entrepreneur, the individual-
speciﬁc entrepreneurial ability as well as the available alternative income possibilities are
relevant. Entrepreneurial ability φ is distributed according to a distribution function
G(φ) with density g(φ), and a ﬁrm run by a more able entrepreneur has a higher labour
productivity. For simplicity we assume that labour productivity in any given ﬁrm is equal
to the entrepreneurial ability of its owner, and it can therefore be represented by the same
variable, φ. As is shown below, proﬁts at the ﬁrm level π(φ) are increasing in a ﬁrm’s
productivity level, implying that an individual with a higher entrepreneurial ability can
realize higher income as a ﬁrm owner.
If an individual decides against becoming an entrepreneur he can choose between two
alternative activities. On the one hand, he can become self-employed, supplying one unit
of distribution services at fee s. On the other hand, he can oﬀer one unit of labour in
the market for production workers. In neither role can the individual make productive
use of his entrepreneurial ability. However, there is an important diﬀerence between these
two alternative choices. While the market for services is perfectly competitive, leading to
identical income streams of all service suppliers, the remuneration of production workers
7is uncertain because wages can diﬀer across ﬁrms and not all production workers actually
ﬁnd a job, due to labour market imperfections. The expected wage of a production worker
is (1 − U) ¯ w, with U being the unemployment rate of workers, and ¯ w the average wage of
those who are employed.
Individuals have to commit themselves to one of the three roles and cannot reverse
their choices, after entrepreneurs have made their investment and hiring decisions.7 In
equilibrium, it has then to be true that expected income from all three activities is the
same. This implies
π(φ∗) = s = (1 − U) ¯ w, (6)
where φ∗ denotes ability of the marginal entrepreneur (i.e. the cutoﬀ ability level). All
variables in (6) are determined in general equilibrium.
2.3 A Model of Inter-Firm Wage Diﬀerentiation
The labour market in our model is characterised by a variant of the fair-wage eﬀort mech-
anism identiﬁed by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). We assume that workers have a preference
for fairness and condition their eﬀort ε on the wage they are paid relative to the wage
they consider to be fair, ˆ w. If ﬁrms pay at least ˆ w, workers provide the normal level of
eﬀort, which, for notational simplicity, is set equal to one. Eﬀort decreases proportionally
if the actual wage w falls short of ˆ w. Formally, we have ε = min(w/ ˆ w,1). Due to w/ε = ˆ w
∀w ≤ ˆ w, proﬁt maximising ﬁrms have no incentive to pay less than ˆ w, so that we can
safely follow Akerlof and Yellen (1990) in assuming w = ˆ w.
A key issue in this line of research is how to determine the fair wage. Fehr and
G¨ achter (2000) point out that the idea of gift exchange, which underlies the fair wage-
eﬀort hypothesis, implies that ﬁrms that make higher proﬁts pay higher wages as well.
In order to build a model that takes this observation seriously, we need two ingredients:
(i) ﬁrms that make diﬀerent proﬁts in equilibrium, and (ii) a speciﬁcation of fair wage
7This is a standard assumption in a setting with certain and uncertain income streams (see e.g. Helpman
and Itskhoki, 2007).
8preferences such that these proﬁt diﬀerences matter in the determination of the fair wage.
At this point, we focus on (ii), and – as far as (i) is concerned – simply postulate that
in equilibrium ﬁrms diﬀer in the proﬁts they are making, deferring the derivation of this
result to section 2.4.
In line with most of the existing literature on the fairness approach to eﬃciency wages,
we assume that the fair wage is a weighted average of two factors, the ﬁrst one being
ﬁrm-internal and the second one being related to market forces. Similar to Kreickemeier
and Nelson (2006), we associate the second component with the expected labour income
per worker: (1−U) ¯ w. The ﬁrm-internal component in determining the reference wage are







[(1 − U) ¯ w]1−θ, (7)
where θ ∈ [0,1] can be interpreted as a rent-sharing parameter. Taking into account
ˆ w(φ) = w(φ), the fair wage speciﬁcation in (7) gives rise to identical wages in all ﬁrms if
θ = 0 (cf. Melitz, 2003), while wages are ﬁrm-speciﬁc if θ > 0.9
8Total proﬁts would be an obvious alternative to operating proﬁts as the ﬁrm-internal component of
the reference wage. The key mechanisms of our analysis do not depend on which of these measures of
ﬁrm success is used, and choosing operating proﬁts makes the model much more tractable. Danthine and
Kurmann (2006) use a diﬀerent ﬁrm-internal component and make the reference wage dependent on output
per worker within a ﬁrm. While acknowledging the potential role of a ﬁrm internal reference point, their
model does not allow for ﬁrm heterogeneity, implying that all ﬁrms within a sector pay the same wage.
9The fair wage approach to eﬃciency wages should be interpreted as a two-stage process, with ﬁrms
oﬀering a wage at stage one and workers deciding upon their eﬀort level at stage two. If it is not possible
to write a binding contract on the eﬀort of workers prior to the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer, ﬁrms have no incentive
to replace their workers by outsiders who declare they would be willing to work for a lower wage. The
reason is that the wage considered fair by workers is ﬁrm-speciﬁc (see eq. (7)). This means that workers
adjust their perception of a fair treatment (and thus the fair wage) to the (expected) operating proﬁt of
the ﬁrm they are working in. Fehr and Falk (1999) provide strong support for a mechanism of this type
from laboratory experiments.
92.4 Firm Distribution and Average Productivity
Relative revenues (or operating proﬁts) and wages of ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities






































By virtue of (3) and (10), more productive ﬁrms charge lower prices and realise a higher
output level. Furthermore, it follows from (8) and (9), that they make higher proﬁts and
therefore pay higher wages, due to the fair-wage eﬀort mechanism set out in section 2.3.
We can now determine a weighted average of productivity levels ˜ φ which is deﬁned in a
way to ensure that the quantity q(˜ φ) is equal to the average output per ﬁrm, Y/M. From








where 1−G(φ∗) is the ex ante share of individuals with an entrepreneurial ability φ ≥ φ∗.














We use the Pareto distribution to parametrise G(φ):
G(φ) = 1 − φ−k g(φ) = kφ−(k+1), (12)
where the lower bound of productivities is normalised to 1 without loss of generality (i.e.
φ ≥ 1), and k is a strictly positive parameter.10 Substituting for G(φ∗) and g(φ) in (11)
10Using ﬁrm level data for eleven European countries, Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006) show that
“Pareto is a fairly good approximation” (p. 17) of the productivity distribution in their data set. Due
to its empirical support and its attractive features in terms of analytical tractability, the assumption of
a Pareto distribution is by now common in the literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms. Prominent examples
include Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).







In order to ensure a well deﬁned average productivity for all admissible values of θ, we
assume k > σ − 1 henceforth.
Denoting by ¯ R aggregate revenues in this economy and by ¯ Π aggregate proﬁts we ﬁnd –
analogous to Melitz (2003) – that ¯ R = Mr(˜ φ) and ¯ Π = Mπ(˜ φ). Together with the previous
results P = p(˜ φ) = 1 and (by deﬁnition) Y = Mq(˜ φ), this illustrates the usefulness of
the particular average deﬁned in (11): The aggregate product market variables in our
model are identical to what they would be if the economy hosted M identical ﬁrms with
productivity ˜ φ.
2.5 Equilibrium Factor Allocation
The resource constraint (RC) of the economy is given by:
L = N − (1 + f)M, (14)
with L denoting the supply of production workers. RC is downward sloping in M − L
space as a higher number of ﬁrms, along with the individuals hired to provide distribution
services for each ﬁrm, leaves fewer individuals for the labour supply.
A second relation between L and M can be derived by rewriting equilibrium condition








The left hand side is the proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm, i.e. income of the entrepreneur with
cutoﬀ ability level φ∗, which eq. (60) shows to be a constant fraction of r(˜ φ), the revenues
of the average ﬁrm. The right hand side equals the labour income per capita, as with
markup pricing ρ equals the labour share of aggregate income. Substituting Y = Mr(˜ φ)
and noting ρ = 1 − 1/σ we obtain the labour indiﬀerence condition (LI)
L =
k(σ − 1)(1 + f)
k − ξ
M. (15)
11Intuitively, for a given aggregate output a higher number of ﬁrms M would imply a lower
revenue of the average ﬁrm r(˜ φ), and consequently a lower proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm. In
order to restore indiﬀerence of the marginal entrepreneur between running the ﬁrm and
not doing so, the expected wage (which is proportional to aggregate output per worker)
has to fall as well. Holding Y constant, this requires an increase in labour supply L.
Hence, LI is upward sloping in M − L space.
The cutoﬀ ability in our model is implicitly given by the deﬁnitory relation M =



























Figure 1: Equilibrium in the closed economy
Figure 1 plots eqs. (14), (15) and (16). The equilibrium values of L and M are determined
by RC and LI in the right quadrant, and the implied value of φ∗ can be read oﬀ the cutoﬀ
















It is immediate from eqs. (17) to (19) that an increase in rent sharing parameter θ increases
M, while reducing L and φ∗. Hence a stronger rent-sharing motive of workers increases
the number of entrepreneurs (or, equivalently, the number of ﬁrms). The logic is as
follows: With a higher value of θ, more productive ﬁrms have to pay relatively higher
wages, thereby giving a relative advantage, ceteris paribus, to less productive ﬁrms (less
able entrepreneurs). The impact of θ on M, L and φ∗ can also be seen in ﬁgure 1,
where an increase in θ rotates the LI locus counter-clockwise, leaving the other two curves
unaﬀected.
2.6 Welfare and Unemployment
In our model with a single homogeneous ﬁnal good, per capita income Y/N is the natural
utilitarian welfare measure. Noting that we have already derived the proportion of workers
in the population, L/N, in eq. (17), we now turn to deriving the output per worker,
Y/L. The fair wage constraint for the ﬁrm with average productivity equals w(˜ φ) =
(r(˜ φ)/σ)θ(ρY/L)1−θ. Substitution from eqs. (9), (13) and (60) yields







and hence the wage of the average ﬁrm is proportional to the income per worker. Com-




















13where ˜ φ is determined by eqs. (13) and (19). Hence, welfare increases proportionally with
the productivity of the average ﬁrm.
To determine the equilibrium unemployment rate, we can use the adding-up condition
that aggregate employment has to equal the sum of the employment levels of all ﬁrms:






Accounting for Ml(˜ φ) = Mq(˜ φ)/˜ φ = Y/˜ φ and using eq. (21), this can be rewritten as




θ k − ξ
k − (1 − θ)ξ
. (23)
By virtue of (23), there is full employment if the wage considered to be fair by workers
does not hinge on the operating proﬁt of the ﬁrm they are working in, i.e. U = 0 if θ = 0.
On the contrary, θ > 0 implies U ∈ (0,1).
With eqs. (22) and (23) at hand, we can now look at the comparative-static eﬀects of
a change in the rent-sharing parameter θ on welfare and unemployment. The respective
results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in θ lowers per capita income Y/N and increases the unem-
ployment rate U.
Proof. See Appendix
There are counteracting eﬀects of a θ increase on the equilibrium unemployment rate.
On the one hand, we know from section 2.5 that a higher θ renders entrepreneurship
more attractive and therefore reduces labour supply L. For a given level of aggregate
employment this reduces the unemployment rate. This is not the end of the story though:
Holding aggregate variables constant, an increase in the rent-sharing parameter raises the
reference wage of all workers, according to (7), and even more so in the more productive
ﬁrms, thereby initially reducing employment in all ﬁrms. This employment reduction
lowers aggregate labour income and therefore works against the direct eﬀect of a θ increase.
For the least productive ﬁrms, it is the indirect eﬀect that dominates, thereby triggering
ﬁrm entry at the bottom end of the ability distribution. For the most productive ﬁrms,
14however, it is the direct eﬀect that dominates, implying a destruction of the “good jobs”
that pay high wages (Davis and Harrigan, 2007). Overall, employment loss in the most
productive ﬁrms is not compensated by additional employment in the least productive
ﬁrms (including the new entrants), and aggregate employment falls by more than the
labour supply, leading to an increase in U. Aggregate output falls due to both the decrease
in aggregate employment and the shift in employment towards less productive ﬁrms.11 As
a consequence, per capita income Y/N unambiguously falls after a θ increase.
2.7 Income Distribution
After deriving aggregate measures to characterise the equilibrium in the closed economy,
we now turn to characterising the income distribution. There is more than one way
of looking at this question, considering that we have three groups of people within the
economy (entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals and workers), and that there is income
heterogeneity within the group of entrepreneurs and within the group of workers. As the
focus of most existing studies is on between-group inequality (see Bernard, Redding and
Schott, 2007, for a recent contribution in the context of heterogeneous ﬁrms), we ﬁrst
consider the ratio of average entrepreneurial income ¯ π and the average income of workers
(1 − U) ¯ w, with the latter being equal to service fee s. This ratio is given by12
¯ π





Note that ω(ξ) > 1.13 This is intuitive as average proﬁts ¯ π are higher than proﬁts of
the least productive ﬁrms π(φ∗), while the marginal entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between
11A higher θ leads to a relatively strong wage increase in the most productive ﬁrms, which translates into
a relatively pronounced price increase of these ﬁrms. This explains a ﬁrst round reallocation of resources
from more productive to less productive ﬁrms. A second round reallocation eﬀect is induced by the entry
of new competitors with a low productivity level, due to an increase in M.
12Note that aggregate proﬁts are given by ¯ Π = M
h
r(˜ φ)/σ − f(1 − U) ¯ w
i
, while average proﬁts equal
¯ π = ¯ Π/M. Accounting for (1−U) ¯ w = r(φ
∗)/[σ(1+f)] and r(˜ φ)/r(φ
?) = k/(k−ξ), one can easily calculate
(24).
13Combining (23) and (24) we can determine ¯ π/ ¯ w = [1/(1+f)]
θ(k+fξ)/[k −(1−θ)ξ] as an alternative
measure of between-group income inequality. However, as (1−U) ¯ w is the relevant criterion when deciding
upon setting up a ﬁrm, we choose the ratio in (24) as our preferred measure of between-group inequality.
15setting up a ﬁrm or supplying its labour in the market for production workers, i.e. π(φ∗) =
(1 − U) ¯ w, according to (6).
To determine within-group inequality, we calculate the Gini coeﬃcients for entrepre-
neurial and labour income.14 As it is shown in detail in the Appendix, the Gini coeﬃcient
for the group of entrepreneurs is given by
AM =
kξ(1 + f)
(k + ξf)(2k − ξ)
(25)
while the Gini coeﬃcient for (employed) production workers is given by
AL =
θξ
2(k − ξ) + θξ
. (26)
Comparing (25) and (26), we obtain AM > AL, so that the inequality of entrepreneurial
income is more pronounced than the inequality of labour income, according to the Gini
criterion.15
With equations (24)-(26) at hand, we can now determine the impact of an increase
in rent-sharing parameter θ on income inequality. The results are summarised in the
following proposition.
14The Gini coeﬃcient is a widely used measure for inequality. It is given by A = 1 − 2
R 1
0 Q(γ)dγ,
with Q(γ) being the Lorenz curve, which determines the share of (proﬁt or labour) income attributed
to the bottom γ percent of individuals in the reference group (entrepreneurs or employed workers). Put
diﬀerently, the Gini coeﬃcient describes the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal in a Lorenz
diagram (multiplied by 2). It takes a value between 0 and 1, with higher values of A reﬂecting higher
inequality.
15In a robustness analysis, we have grouped together entrepreneurs and self-employed service providers
to obtain an inequality measure for the “independent civilian labour force”. However, as the respective
Gini calculations for income inequality of this somewhat more comprehensive group of individuals did
not provide any additional insights, we do not discuss this extended coeﬃcient here. Furthermore, since
accounting for unemployed workers (who earn zero income) would not change our results, we exclude
them from the analysis when calculating the Gini coeﬃcient for labour income. Ignoring self-employed
and unemployed individuals when talking about intra-group inequality implies that the Lorenz curves,
underlying the Gini coeﬃcients in (25) and (26), are strictly increasing and strictly convex functions in
the respective Lorenz diagrams.
16Proposition 2. An increase in θ lowers both between-group inequality ω(ξ) and the Gini
coeﬃcient for entrepreneurial income AM. An increase in θ increases the Gini coeﬃcient
for labour income AL.
Proof. See Appendix.
From the analysis in section 2.5, we know that an increase in θ renders entrepreneurship
more attractive and therefore increases M. As a higher M implies that individuals with a
lower entrepreneurial ability start up a ﬁrm and that labour supply declines, it induces a
fall in between-group inequality ω(ξ). Furthermore, a higher θ increases the weight of the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in the wage considered to be fair by workers (see (7)). This raises
the variable production costs of more productive ﬁrms relative to their less productive
competitors. As a consequence, the diﬀerential of revenues in (9) declines and so does
proﬁt inequality AM. A higher weight of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in the reference
wage of workers tends to increase the inequality of labour income. This eﬀect is reinforced
by the entry of less productive ﬁrms. However, there is also a counteracting eﬀect, as an
increase in the variable production costs of more productive ﬁrms relative to their less
productive competitors lowers the market share (and thus the employment share) of these
ﬁrms. All other things equal, this tends to reduce income inequality of production workers.
The latter eﬀect is dominated by the ﬁrst two ones, however, so that the Gini coeﬃcient
for labour income goes up. By striving harder to get their fair share of ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
workers therefore increase inequality within their group. This completes our discussion of
the autarky scenario.
3 The Open Economy
We now look at the trade equilibrium in a world of two identical countries. As in the
standard Melitz model, there are two types of trade costs: variable transport costs of the
iceberg type, represented by parameter τ > 1, and ﬁxed export costs. Fixed export costs
are associated with the necessity of a local distribution system in the foreign economy.
The required amount of fx units of service inputs is again contracted to self-employed
17individuals. Because these individuals have the choice between working for either type of
ﬁrm (exporter or non-exporter), their remuneration in either role has to be the same in
equilibrium, and ﬁxed export costs become sfx.
3.1 Partitioning of Firms by Export Status
The analysis focuses on the empirically relevant case where not all ﬁrms are exporters, and
hence there is self-selection of ﬁrms into export status. In order to ﬁnd the exact condition
for this to hold in equilibrium, we have to take into account that with the speciﬁcation of
the fair wage constraint in eq. (7) a ﬁrm with higher operating proﬁts has to pay a higher
wage, and hence an exporter pays higher wages than a non-exporter ceteris paribus.
This implies that in the open economy the revenue diﬀerential between two ﬁrms does
not only depend on their relative productivity levels but also on their respective export
status. We therefore have to distinguish between domestic revenues of exporters and non-
exporters. With the former serving consumers in more than one market and the latter
serving only domestic consumers (and thus being active in one market), we use superscripts
m and o, respectively, to indicate revenues of these two ﬁrm types. In the case of exporting
ﬁrms, we also have to distinguish between revenues associated with domestic and foreign
sales, using subscript x to denote the latter. For an exporting ﬁrm with productivity
level φ and revenues in its home market of rm(φ), revenues from exporting are given by
rm
x (φ) = τ1−σrm(φ).
In analogy to eq. (8), the home market revenue diﬀerential of two ﬁrms that have
















Both equations can be solved to give
rm
ro = (1 + τ1−σ)−θξ < 1. (27)
Hence, a ﬁrm of a given productivity has lower revenue in its home market if it chooses
to become an exporter because the higher operating proﬁts that exporting entails lead to
18higher wages via the fair wage constraint, and therefore higher marginal cost. The relative
gross gain from exporting (RGE) of a ﬁrm with productivity φ is then given by
(1 + τ1−σ)rm(φ) − ro(φ)
ro(φ)
= (1 + τ1−σ)
ξ











Figure 2: Determination of domestic and export cutoﬀ productivities
The relative costs of entering the export market (RCE), also measured as a proportion
of a non-exporter’s operating proﬁts, are given by sfxσ/ro(φ). Figure 2 shows the RGE
and RCE loci, and the marginal exporter with productivity φ∗
x is found at the intersection
of the two loci. Using eq. (6) to substitute for s, we ﬁnd that for the marginal ﬁrm, i.e. the
ﬁrm with productivity φ∗, RCE equals fx/(1 + f), and hence the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the export selection eﬀect to be present is given by
fx
1 + f
> (1 + τ1−σ)
ξ
σ−1 − 1. (29)
It is assumed throughout that this condition holds.
193.2 The Share of Exporters and Average Productivity
Figure 2 does not allow us to pin down the two cutoﬀ levels φ∗ and φ∗
x explicitly, because
s – and therefore the position of the RCE locus – is not yet determined. However, we can
still derive the fraction of ﬁrms that export χ, which depends only on the ratio of the two
cutoﬀ levels: As the mass of exporting ﬁrms and the mass of all ﬁrms are given by 1−G(φ∗
x)
and 1 − G(φ∗), respectively, with the assumption of Pareto-distributed productivities it
follows that χ = [1−G(φ∗
x)]/[1−G(φ∗)] = (φ∗/φ∗











= s(1 + f),
where the ﬁrst expression states that the operating proﬁts the marginal exporting ﬁrm
makes from exporting have to equal the ﬁxed exporting cost, and the second expression
is just a rewritten version of the indiﬀerence condition (6) for the marginal entrepreneur.
Lastly, in analogy to eq. (9) we can relate the relative productivities of the ﬁrms at the
two cutoﬀs to their relative operating proﬁts (or revenues): (φ∗/φ∗
x)ξ = ro(φ∗)/ro(φ∗
x).

















and one can immediately see that χ is strictly decreasing in both τ and fx, as can be
expected. With both countries being symmetric, the total number of producers selling to
one market is given by Mt = M(1 + χ).
It was shown above that for the closed economy welfare increases proportionally with
the average productivity of ﬁrms ˜ φa(subscript a is used henceforth to denote autarky values
of the respective variables). In the open economy with self-selection of ﬁrms into export
status it is useful to distinguish between two average productivities that use diﬀerent
weights in the aggregation of ﬁrm productivities. We denote by ˜ φ the average productivity
of domestic ﬁrms using (hypothetical) output shares that would result if ﬁrms were paying
wages that reﬂect their domestic (rather than total) operating proﬁts. While these output
shares are not actually observed in the open economy, the average is still very useful
because it is proportional to the cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ according to eq. (13). We also
20deﬁne a weighted productivity average of all ﬁrms selling in a particular market, ˜ φt. This
productivity accounts for the fact that exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters and
that international trade involves transportation costs. In analogy to the closed economy,
we formulate ˜ φt in a way to ensure qo(˜ φt) = Y/Mt, i.e. the quantity produced by the
average ﬁrm for its domestic market – provided this ﬁrm is a non-exporter – equals the
average output per ﬁrm selling to this market.16 In analogy to the average productivity
in the closed economy ˜ φa, the deﬁnition of ˜ φt furthermore implies P = po(˜ φt) = 1 and
Y = ¯ R = Mtro(˜ φt). Hence, for the determination of aggregate product market variables
in the open economy version of the model ˜ φt assumes the role that ˜ φa has for the closed
economy version.
It is shown in the appendix that ˜ φt and ˜ φ are related by







where ∆ ≡ (1+f+χfx)/(1+f) is the ratio of ﬁxed resource requirements of the respective
average ﬁrms under trade and autarky. In general it is ambiguous which of the two average
productivities is larger. There are three eﬀects that determine their relative size, and they
work in opposite directions. The export selection eﬀect increases ˜ φt, ceteris paribus, as only
the most productive foreign ﬁrms export, thereby increasing the share of high productivity
ﬁrms in the average. The remaining two eﬀects both work to decrease ˜ φt relative to ˜ φ:
The lost in transit eﬀect caused by goods melting away en route reduces the share of
foreign exporters in overall domestic sales. The exporter wage premium eﬀect reduces the
share of foreign and domestic exporters in overall domestic sales, as exporting ﬁrms have
to pay higher wages than non-exporters with the same productivity because their proﬁts
are higher. Both eﬀects lower the average as they reduce the weight of high productivity
ﬁrms. It is immediate from eq. (31) that ˜ φt = ˜ φ if and only if fx = 1 + f. With fx
exceeding 1 + f the export selection eﬀect dominates, and hence we get ˜ φt > ˜ φ, while the
reverse ranking of the two average productivities holds if fx is smaller than 1 + f, and
16This deﬁnition of ˜ φt does not imply that a ﬁrm with productivity ˜ φt is actually a non-exporter. If
this ﬁrm was an exporter, its output in the domestic market would be q
m(˜ φt) < q
o(˜ φt) = Y/Mt due to the
wage premium it would have to pay in this case (see the discussion in section 3.1).
21hence the export selection eﬀect is weakened.
The implied revenue diﬀerential follows from eq. (9) as ro(˜ φt)/ro(˜ φ) = ∆/(1+χ), and
multiplying both sides by M leads to
Mtro(˜ φt) = M∆ro(˜ φ) (32)
The left hand side of eq. (32) equals aggregate output Y . It is shown to be equal to
the aggregate output of a closed economy with ﬁxed resource requirements which are a
multiple ∆ of the domestic ﬁxed resource requirements in the open economy, 1+f. This is
intuitively plausible, as (1+f)∆ equals the average ﬁxed resource requirements (including
those for exporting) in the open economy.
3.3 Equilibrium Factor Allocation
In analogy to the autarky scenario, we can now determine the productivity of the marginal
ﬁrm, φ∗, the mass of entrepreneurs M and the supply of labor L. The resource constraint
for the open economy is given by
RCt: L = N − (1 + f)∆M, (33)
Equilibrium condition (60) from the closed economy equilibrium still holds, with ro(˜ φ)
replacing r(˜ φ). Using Y = M∆ro(˜ φ), this implies the labour indiﬀerence condition for the
open economy
LIt: L =
k(σ − 1)(1 + f)∆
k − ξ
M. (34)
The relationship between φ∗ and M is unchanged and given by eq. (16).
All three loci are represented in ﬁgure 3, where the respective loci from the closed
economy equilibrium are represented by dotted lines. The RC locus rotates counter-
clockwise because in the open economy the ﬁxed resource requirement of ﬁrms is higher
on average (by a factor ∆) due to ﬁxed export costs, and hence for a given number of
ﬁrms the number of available workers decreases. The LI locus on the other hand rotates





















Figure 3: Equilibrium in the open economy
domestic revenue of the average ﬁrm, ro(˜ φ), as foreign ﬁrms with a high productivity level
enter the domestic market in the open economy. This would imply both a lower revenue
and a lower proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm. In order to restore indiﬀerence of the marginal
entrepreneur between running the ﬁrm and not doing so, the expected wage (proportional
to aggregate output per worker) would have to fall as well. For a given level of Y this
requires an increase in the number of workers L (by a factor ∆).
Together, LIt and RCt allow us to determine L and M, and the resulting value for M

















By comparison to eqs. (17) to (19) we see that the mass of entrepreneurs shrinks after the
opening up to international trade, and therefore the cutoﬀ ability increases. In contrast,
the labour supply stays constant. These eﬀects can be veriﬁed by inspection of ﬁgure 3.
3.4 Welfare and Unemployment
With the results in section 3.3 at hand, we can now turn to determining welfare and
unemployment in the open economy. As under autarky, we use the fair wage constraint
of the average ﬁrm, which now becomes wo(˜ φt) = (ro(˜ φt)/σ)θ(ρY/L)1−θ. Accounting for














where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side equals (˜ φt/˜ φ)
ξ
σ−1 and the second term equals
˜ φ/˜ φa. The employment rate of production workers in the open economy follows from the
adding-up condition:












Proceeding as in the case of the closed economy we arrive at
1 − U =
Γ
∆
(1 − Ua) (39)
with








We can now compare welfare and unemployment in the autarky equilibrium with the
respective values for the open economy. This gives the following result.
24Proposition 3. Opening up to international trade increases the rate of unemployment.
Furthermore, the condition fx ≥ 1 + f is suﬃcient for a positive welfare eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Considering the welfare eﬀect ﬁrst, we know
from the analysis of the autarky case that, all other things equal, per capita income Y/N
increases with the average productivity of ﬁrms ˜ φa (see (22)). Furthermore, it has been
shown in section 3.3 that opening up to international trade renders ﬁrm ownership for the
least productive entrepreneurs unattractive, implying a decline in M and an increase in the
marginal productivity φ∗. This induces an increase in the average productivity of domestic
ﬁrms ˜ φ as deﬁned above. However, as shown above, the average productivity of all ﬁrms
in the market, which is represented by ˜ φt, can be larger or smaller than one, depending on
the relative strength of the export-selection, lost-in-transit and exporter-wage-premium
eﬀects, respectively. With fx ≥ 1+f we have ˜ φt/˜ φ ≥ 1, opening up to international trade
unambiguously increases the average productivity in the market and, therefore, per capita
income Y/N. In contrast, with fx < 1+f we have ˜ φt/˜ φ < 1, and hence while opening up
to international trade unambiguously increases ˜ φ, the average productivity in the market
and, therefore, per capita income may fall if fx/(1 + f) is suﬃciently small.17
To provide an intuition for the unemployment eﬀects of trade liberalisation, it is useful
to focus on a parameter constellation with fx = 1 + f, ﬁrst. From above, we know that
per capita income increases in this case. An increase in per capita income, however, is
associated with an increase in the demand for ﬁnal and intermediate goods. All other
things equal, this leads to an increase in the demand for labour, thereby reducing equilib-
rium unemployment. However, the increase in revenues of the most productive ﬁrms leads
to a higher reference wage of workers in these ﬁrms, according to (7), so that the labour
demand increase following the opening up to international trade is weakened by the fair
wage mechanism described in section 2.3. Furthermore, there is an additional counteract-
17In a simulation exercise, we have shown that for a parameter constellation with k = 4, ρ = 0.5, f = 2,
τ = 2 and θ = 0.25, the value fx = 2.38737 separates the gains-from-trade and the losses-from-trade
scenarios.
25ing eﬀect, as the increase in the average productivity level implies that less labour input
is needed to produce a given output level. The two latter eﬀects dominate if fx = 1 + f,
so that unemployment unambiguously increases in this case. If fx 6= 1 + f, there are
additional implications, because the combined lost-in-transit and exporter-wage-premium
eﬀects are not equal in absolute value to the export-selection eﬀect. However, these ad-
ditional implications do not reverse the aforementioned outcome, so that unemployment
also increases if ˜ φt 6= ˜ φ.
Finally, it is possible to go beyond the results derived so far, and make some inference
about the eﬀects of a marginal reduction in either τ or fx on welfare and aggregate
employment. Proposition 3 provides the natural starting point, as it involves a comparison
of the autarky situation, χ = 0, with the situation of an arbitrary χ ∈ (0,1). It follows
then directly that a marginal reduction in either transport cost parameter increases the
unemployment rate and – under the additional assumption fx ≥ 1+f – leads to an increase
in welfare as long as χ, the proportion of ﬁrms that export, is suﬃciently small. However,
the eﬀects of a τ or fx reduction need not be monotonic, i.e. further trade liberalisation
can reduce welfare and/or the rate of unemployment for suﬃciently low levels of transport
cost.
3.5 Income Distribution
Similar to the autarky scenario, we use the ratio between the average proﬁt of domestic
ﬁrms, ¯ πt = (1+χ)ro(˜ φt)−(f+χfx)(1−U) ¯ w, and the expected labour income of production
workers, (1 − U) ¯ w, as our measure for between-group inequality. Furthermore, to deter-
mine within-group inequality of proﬁts and labour income we look at the respective Gini
coeﬃcients. Deferring derivation details to the Appendix, we can note that between-group
inequality in the open economy is determined by
¯ πt
(1 − U) ¯ w
=
k + ξ(f + χfx)
k − ξ
(41)
in the open economy. Furthermore, the Gini coeﬃcient for proﬁt income is given by
AM =
kξ(1 + f + χfx) + (k − ξ)ξχfx(1 − χ)
(2k − ξ)[k + ξ(f + χfx)]
, (42)
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L denoting the Gini coeﬃcient for labor income in the autarky scenario. As with
θ = 0 all ﬁrms pay the same wage, it is clear that limθ→0 AL = 0 must hold. A comparison
of eqs. (24) to (26) and (41) to (43) gives the following result.
Proposition 4. Opening up to international trade increases between-group inequality as
well as within-group inequality for both entrepreneurs and workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
For an intuition of the between-group inequality eﬀect, note ﬁrst that entrepreneurial in-
come of the marginal producer is linked to the expected (or average) income of production
workers, according to indiﬀerence condition (6). This implies that the increase in per
capita income Y/N (see Proposition 3) translates into a pari passu increase of (1 − U) ¯ w
and πo(φ∗). However, there are additional proﬁt gains for the most productive ﬁrms, due
to exports to the foreign market. As a consequence average proﬁt income including both
exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms rises disproportionally, thereby inducing an increase in
between-group inequality after the opening up to international trade.
With regard to the impact of trade liberalisation on the Gini coeﬃcient of entrepre-
neurial income, we have to distinguish two counteracting eﬀects. On the one hand, the
exit of the least productive ﬁrms reduces, all other things equal, within-group inequality
among entrepreneurs. On the other hand, selection of the most productive ﬁrms into ex-
port status raises within-group inequality in the group of entrepreneurs. In our setting, it
is the second eﬀect that dominates, so that Gini coeﬃcient AM is unambiguously higher
in the open economy. These two sides of the selection eﬀect – exit of the least productive
ﬁrms and exporting of the most productive ones – are also crucial for an understanding of
how opening up to international trade aﬀects the Gini coeﬃcient for labour income, AL.
27On the one hand, because the least productive ﬁrms pay the lowest wages, exit of these
ﬁrms lowers inequality of labour income, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, expansion of
the most productive ﬁrms due to exports to the foreign market raises inequality of labour
income, since these ﬁrms pay the highest wages. The latter eﬀect is reinforced by the
fair-wage mechanism in (7), as access to the foreign market stimulates operating proﬁts
and, thereby, induces an increase in the reference wage of workers in exporting ﬁrms.18
In analogy to the previous section, we can use the results in Proposition 4 to get some
insight into the eﬀects of marginal trade liberalisation on income inequality. In particular,
using the same reasoning as in section 3.4, we can infer that marginal reductions in τ or
fx increase all three measures of income inequality for suﬃciently low values of χ. It is
furthermore possible to show that both types of trade liberalisation exhibit a monotonic
impact on inter-group inequality as long as there is selection of the best ﬁrms into export
status, i.e. χ < 1. On the other hand the impact of trade cost changes on the two Gini
coeﬃcients turns out to be non-monotonic in general.
4 Conclusion
The key objective of this paper is to present an analytically tractable theoretical framework
that allows us to account for the empirical fact that the recent wave of globalisation with a
surge in international outsourcing activities has been accompanied by a surge in both inter-
and intra-group inequality. For this purpose, we build a model in which there is income
inequality among the members of two key groups of individuals in the economy: the group
of entrepreneurs and the group of production workers. There is self-selection of individuals
into these two groups, and the group of production workers consists of individuals whose
18When analysing the inequality eﬀects, we have also shown that a movement from autarky to trade
shifts the Lorenz curve for proﬁt and labour income downwards in the respective Lorenz curve diagrams.
This implies that, even according the relatively strict criterion of Lorenz dominance, both labour and
entrepreneurial income are less even distributed in the open economy. However, in the interest brevity, we
have deferred a rigorous analysis of the Lorenz curve eﬀects to a supplement, which is available from the
authors upon request.
28entrepreneurial ability is too low to make it worthwhile for them to run a ﬁrm. While
ﬁrms run by more able entrepreneurs make higher proﬁts, the entrepreneurial ability of
production workers has no bearing on their respective job performance. Still, wages are
diﬀerentiated within the group of production workers because there is rent sharing at the
ﬁrm level due to fairness preferences of workers, leading to higher wages for employees in
ﬁrms with higher operating proﬁts.
Comparing the autarky scenario with the open economy case, we ﬁnd that while,
subject to only mild restrictions, per capita income increases and hence there are typically
aggregate gains from trade, not all individuals participate in these gains to an equal extent.
For one, trade liberalisation increases unemployment among production workers, and those
workers who lose their job are deﬁnitely worse oﬀ in the open economy. Furthermore,
average inequality between the group of entrepreneurs and the group of workers increases,
because entrepreneurs gain disproportionately. Even within these groups there are notable
diﬀerences in the gains from trade liberalisation: the most able entrepreneurs see their
incomes soar, and this eﬀect is instrumental to an increase of income inequality within the
group of entrepreneurs. The income distribution of employed production workers becomes
more unequal as well, as the employees in the high-productivity ﬁrms participate in the
economic success of their employers.
29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1










































Second, diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to θ gives
d(1 − U)
dθ
= (1 − U)

−ln(1 + f) +
ξ [θkξ − (k − ξ)]
(k − ξ)[k − (1 − θ)ξ]

.
Noting k −ξ > θkξ ⇐⇒ k > σ −1, the term in brackets is strictly negative, and hence we
have d(1 − U)/dθ < 0. This completes the proof. QED.
Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (25)
A ﬁrst ingredient we need to determine the Gini coeﬃcient for entrepreneurial income is
Π(¯ φ)/¯ Π, which gives the ratio of cumulative proﬁts for all ﬁrms with a productivity level










Now, deﬁne γ ≡ 1 −
 ¯ φ/φ∗−k, where γ is the proportion of all ﬁrms with a productivity











which represents the Lorenz curve. Note that QM(0) = 0, QM(1) = 1 and Q0
M(γ) > 0.
The Gini coeﬃcient in (25) then follows from AM = 1 − 2
R 1
0 QM(γ)dγ. QED.
30Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (26)
Aggregate labour income in the economy is given by ¯ W = ρY . As before, we now derive
aggregate labour income of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities up to ¯ φ as a

















We deﬁne γ as the proportion of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities lower than
or equal to ¯ φ, resulting in γ ≡ 1−
 ¯ φ/φ∗(1−θ)ξ−k. Substituting for ¯ φ/φ∗, we arrive at the
following expression for the Lorenz curve:
QL(γ) = 1 − (1 − γ)
k−ξ
k−ξ+θξ.
The Gini coeﬃcient in (26) follows from AL = 1 − 2
R 1
0 QL(γ)dγ. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider dξ/dθ = −ξ2 < 0. Then, noting ω0(ξ) = k(1 + f)/(k − ξ)2, according to (24),
implies ω0(ξ) × dξ/dθ < 0. Furthermore, rearranging terms in (25) gives AM = k(1 +
f)/[(k/ξ + f)(2k − ξ)], so that dAM/dξ > 0 and thus dAM/dθ < 0 is immediate. Let
us now rearrange terms in (26), to obtain AL = 1/[2g(θ) + 1], with g(θ) ≡ k/(θξ) − 1/θ.
Substituting θξ = θ(σ −1)/[1+θ(σ −1)], further gives g(θ) = [k −(σ −1)]/[θ(σ −1)]+k,
with g0(θ) >,=,< 0 if σ − 1 >,=,< k. This implies that k > σ − 1 is necessary and
suﬃcient for dAL/dθ > 0, which completes the proof. QED.
31Derivation of the Relationship between ˜ φ and ˜ φt in (31)




































Noting that (1 + τ1−σ)[pm(φ)/po(φ)]1−σ = (1 + τ1−σ)rm(φ)/ro(φ) = (1 + (τ1−σ))ξ/(σ−1),
according to (28), and accounting for po(φ)/po(˜ φ) = (φ/˜ φ)−ξ/(σ−1), according to (10), we











































Finally, deﬁning ˜ φt in a way to ensure po(˜ φt) = 1, which is equivalent to qo(˜ φt) = Y/Mt
and solving for the productivity average, we arrive at














which, by virtue of (30), can be reformulated to (31).
Proof of Proposition 3





according to (31), it follows from eqs. (39) and (40) that
U > Ua ⇐⇒

 










> 1 and χ < 1, the following inequality holds:
 










and the right-hand side expression equals fx/(1 + f), according to (30).




















Hence, fx ≥ 1 + f is suﬃcient for (Y/N)/(Y a/N) > 1. This completes the proof. QED.
Derivation of Between-Group Inequality in (41)
To determine between-group inequality in the open economy, note ﬁrst that aggregate
proﬁts can be written in the following way: ¯ Πt = M[(1+χ)ro(˜ φt)/σ−(f +χfx)(1−U) ¯ w].
Substituting into ¯ πt = ¯ Πt/M and accounting for (1 + χ)ro(˜ φt) = [1 + χfx/(1 + f)]ro(˜ φ),
gives ¯ πt = (1 + f + χfx)ro(˜ φ)/[σ(1 + f)] − (f + χfx)(1 − U) ¯ w. Dividing ¯ πt by (1 − U) ¯ w
and accounting for (1 − U) ¯ w = ro(φ∗)/[σ(1 + f)], we further obtain ¯ πt/[(1 − U) ¯ w] =
(1+f+χfx)ro(˜ φ)/ro(φ∗)−(f+χfx). Substituting ro(˜ φ)/ro(φ∗) = k/(k−ξ) and rearranging
terms, ﬁnally gives (41). QED.
Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (42)
The derivation of the Gini coeﬃcient in the open economy is similar to the respective
derivation under autarky, with the mere diﬀerence that we have to distinguish between
exporters and non-exporters if trade is possible. The ratio of cumulative proﬁts for all
non-exporters with a productivity level lower than or equal to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗,φ∗
x) and aggregate









33Similar to the autarky scenario, we can now deﬁne γ ≡ 1−
 ¯ φ/φ∗−k and rewrite the latter




k + ξ(f + χfx)
h




k + ξ(f + χfx)
.
Note that Q1
M represents the ﬁrst segment of the Lorenz curve, which is relevant if γ ∈
[0,bM), with bM ≡ 1 − (φ∗
x/φ∗)−k = 1 − χ. Evaluating Q1










k − ξf(1 − χ)
k + ξ(f + χfx)
.
The ratio of cumulative proﬁts for all ﬁrms (exporters and non-exporters) with a
productivity level up to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗














k(1 + f)(1 + τ1−σ)1−θξ
k + ξ(f + χfx)
h
χ1−ξ/k − (1 − γ)1−ξ/k
i
−
(k − ξ)(f + fx)(γ − bM)




M(bM). Putting the two segments together, the Lorenz curve in







M(γ) if γ ∈ [0,bM)
Q2




M(1) = 1 and dQt
M(γ)/dγ > 0. The Gini coeﬃcient in (42) then




Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (43)
In the open economy, we have to distinguish between workers employed in non-exporting
and those employed in exporting ﬁrms. Let us ﬁrst determine the ratio between aggregate
labour income of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivity levels up to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗,φ∗
x)





















We now deﬁne γ as the proportion of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities lower
than or equal to ¯ φ, resulting in γ ≡ [1 − (¯ φ/φ∗)(1−θξ−k)]/Γ if ¯ φ < φ∗
x. Note that the γ-φ
relationship determined by the latter expression diﬀers from the respective relationship in
the closed economy, as the most-productive ﬁrms now have access to a foreign market and
therefore increase their employment share. Substituting for ¯ φ/φ∗, we obtain the following




1 + f + χfx







L(γ) is the relevant segment, if γ ∈ [0,bL), with bL ≡ [1−(φ∗
x/φ∗)(1−θ)ξ−k]/Γ =
[1 − χ1−(1−θ)ξ/k]/Γ. Evaluating Q1









To determine the ratio between aggregate labour income of workers employed in ﬁrms
with productivity levels up to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗

















(1 + f)(1 + τ1−σ)1−θξ







With γ being deﬁned as the proportion of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities
lower than or equal to ¯ φ, we have γ ≡ 1−(1+τ1−σ)(1−θ)ξ/(σ−1)(¯ φ/φ∗)(1−θξ−k)/Γ if ¯ φ ≥ φ∗
x.
Substituting for ¯ φ/φ∗ and considering Q1
L(bL) from above, we arrive at the following
expression for the second segment of the Lorenz curve:
Q2
L(γ) = 1 −
(1 + f)(1 + τ1−σ)1−θξ









L(bL). Putting together the Lorenz curve for labour income in the







L if γ ∈ [0,bL)
Q2
L if γ ∈ [bL,1].
Qt
L has the usual properties: Qt
L(0) = 0, Qt
L(1) = 1 and dQt
L(γ)/dγ > 0. The Gini




Proof of Proposition 4
Denoting autarky equilibrium variables by superscript a, it follows from (24) and (41) that
¯ πt/[(1 − U) ¯ w]





Hence, between-group inequality is higher in the open economy. Furthermore, comparing
eqs. (25) and (42) we can conclude that
Aa
M >,=,< AM ⇐⇒ 0 >,=,< ξ(k − ξ)χfx[2k + ξf − χ(k + ξf)].
Noting that 2k +ξf > χ(k +ξf) holds for any χ ∈ [0,1], this implies Aa
M < AM and thus
a higher inequality of entrepreneurial income in the open economy.













(1 + τ1−σ)ξ/(σ−1) − 1

(1 + f)χ−ξ/k from (30) and Γ − 1 = [(1 +
τ1−σ)(1−θ)ξ/(σ−1) − 1]χ1−(1−θ)ξ/k from (40), we can further conclude that AL >,=,< 0
if χ1−ξ/k(1 + f)Ω(χ) >,=,< 0, where
Ω(χ) ≡ (k − ξ)
h




− χθξ/k[k − (1 − θ)ξ]
h





Noting Ω0(χ) < 0 and Ω(1) = 0, we obtain Ω(χ) > 0 and thus AL > Aa
L for any χ ∈ (0,1).
This completes the proof of Proposition 4 . QED.
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